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Abstract. Location privacy has been extensively studied in the litera-
ture. However, existing location privacy models are either not rigorous
or not customizable, which limits the trade-off between privacy and util-
ity in many real-world applications. To address this issue, we propose a
new location privacy notion called PGLP, i.e., Policy Graph based Lo-
cation Privacy, providing a rich interface to release private locations
with customizable and rigorous privacy guarantee. First, we design the
privacy metrics of PGLP by extending differential privacy. Specifically,
we formalize a user’s location privacy requirements using a location pol-
icy graph, which is expressive and customizable. Second, we investigate
how to satisfy an arbitrarily given location policy graph under adver-
sarial knowledge. We find that a location policy graph may not always
be viable and may suffer location exposure when the attacker knows the
user’s mobility pattern. We propose efficient methods to detect location
exposure and repair the policy graph with optimal utility. Third, we
design a private location trace release framework that pipelines the de-
tection of location exposure, policy graph repair, and private trajectory
release with customizable and rigorous location privacy. Finally, we con-
duct experiments on real-world datasets to verify the effectiveness of the
privacy-utility trade-off and the efficiency of the proposed algorithms.
Keywords: Spatiotemporal · Trajectory Privacy · Differential Privacy
· Location-Based Services.
1 Introduction
As GPS-enabled devices such as smartphones or wearable gadgets are perva-
sively used and rapidly developed, location data have been continuously gener-
ated, collected, and analyzed. These personal location data connecting the online
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when he was at Emory University.
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and offline worlds are precious, not only because they could enable innovative
applications such as Uber or Poke´mon Go, but also because they could be of
great value for the society such as the smart city.
On the other hand, privacy concerns hinder the extensive use of big loca-
tion data generated by users in the real world. Studies have shown that location
data could reveal sensitive personal information such as home and workplace,
religious and sexual inclinations [20] [29]. According to a survey [13], 78% smart-
phone users among 180 participants believe that Apps accessing their location
pose privacy threats. As a result, the study of private location release has drawn
increasing research interest and many location privacy models have been pro-
posed in the last decades (see survey [28]).
However, existing location privacy models for private location releases are ei-
ther not rigorous or not customizable. Following the seminal paper [16], the early
location privacy models were designed based on k-anonymity [30] and adapted to
different scenarios such as distributed setting [36], mobile P2P environments [9],
trajectory release [3] and personalized k-anonymity for location privacy [15]. The
follow-up studies revealed that k-anonymity might not be rigorous because it syn-
tactically defines privacy as a property of the final “anonymized” dataset [24] and
thus suffers many realistic attacks when the adversary has background knowl-
edge about the dataset [23,25]. To this end, the state-of-the-art location privacy
models [1, 7, 31–33] were extended from differential privacy (DP) [10] to private
location release since DP is considered a rigorous privacy notion which defines
privacy as a property of the algorithm. Although these DP-based location pri-
vacy models are rigorously defined, yet they are not customizable for different
scenarios with various requirements on privacy-utility trade-off. Taking an ex-
ample of Geo-Indistinguishability [1], which is the first and influential DP-based
location privacy, the protection level is solely controlled by a single parameter 
to achieve indistinguishability among all possible locations.
Whereas, this one-size-fits-all approach may not fit every user’s privacy re-
quirement or every application’s utility-privacy trade-off. For example, some
locations could be more sensitive than others. Furthermore, different location-
based services (LBS) may need different location privacy policies to strike the
right balance between privacy and utility. For instance, a proper location privacy
policy for weather apps could be “allowing to disclose a user’s city-level location
but ensuring indistinguishability among locations in each city”, which guaran-
tees both reasonable privacy and high usability for a city-level weather forecast.
Similarly, for POI recommendation [2] or trajectory mining [27], a suitable loca-
tion privacy policy could be “allowing to disclose the semantic category (e.g., a
restaurant or a shop) of a user’s location but ensuring indistinguishability among
locations with the same category”, so that the LBS provider may know the user
is at a restaurant or a shop, but not sure which restaurant or which shop.
In this work, we study private location release with customizable and rigorous
privacy. There are three significant challenges to achieve this goal. First, we lack
a rigorous and customizable location privacy metrics and mechanisms. The clos-
est work regarding customizable privacy is Blowfish privacy [19] for statistical
Customizable and Rigorous Location Privacy through Policy Graph 3
Ct+1Ct
Time t Time t+1
Possible locations Possible locations
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: An example of location policy graph and the constrained domains (i.e.,
possible locations) Ct and Ct+1 at time t and t+ 1, respectively.
privacy, which uses a graph to represent a customizable privacy requirement, in
which a node represents a possible database instance to be protected, and an
edge represents indistinguishability between the two possible databases. How-
ever, the privacy metrics of Blowfish privacy and its mechanisms for statistical
data release, where the outputs are the analytical query results over the inputs of
multiple users’ data, are not applicable in our setting of private location release
w.r.t. a single user.
The second challenge is how to satisfy an arbitrarily given location privacy
policy under adversarial knowledge. In practice, as shown in [33, 34], an adver-
sary could take advantage of side information to rule out inadmissible locations6
and reduce a user’s possible locations into a small set, which we call constrained
domain. An immediate consequence is that the location privacy policy may not
be viable under a constrained domain. For the example in Fig.1, assuming the
attacker knows that the user’s locations at time t and time t+ 1 are within the
constrained domains Ct = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6} and Ct+1 = {s2, s3, s5}, respec-
tively, we can see that protecting the privacy (i.e., indistinguishability) between
any locations and s4 (or s6) at time t+1 is a lost cause since the attacker already
knows that the user could not be at s4 (or s6) at time t. More importantly, the
user may suffer location exposure if she is at s5 at time t+ 1 (we will elaborate
how this could happen in Sec.4.1).
The third challenge is how to fix the above problem and release private
locations continuously with high utility. We attempt to provide an end-to-end
solution that takes the user’s true location and a predefined location privacy
policy as inputs, and outputs private location trace on the fly. We also need to
derive the overall privacy guarantee of multiple releases.
We summarize the research questions in this work below.
– How to design a rigorous location privacy metrics with customizable location
privacy policy? (Section 3)
– How to detect the problematic location privacy policy and repair it with
high utility? (Sections 4)
– How to design an end-to-end framework to release private location continu-
ously? (Section 5)
6 For example, it is impossible to move from Kyoto to London in a short time.
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1.1 Contributions
In this work, we propose a new location privacy metrics and mechanisms for
releasing private location trace with flexible and rigorous privacy. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first DP-based location privacy model with customiz-
able privacy. Our contributions are summarized below.
First, we formalize PGLP, i.e., Policy Graph based Location Privacy, which
is a rigorous privacy metrics extending differential privacy with a customizable
location policy graph. Inspired by a statistical privacy notion of Blowfish privacy
[19], we design location policy graph to represent which information need to be
protected and which is not. In a location policy graph (such as the one shown
in Fig.1), the nodes are the user’s possible locations, and the edges indicate
the privacy requirements regarding the connected locations: an attacker should
not be able to significantly distinguish which location is more probable to be
the user’s true location by observing the released location. PGLP is a general
location privacy model comparing with the prior art of DP-based location privacy
notions, such as Geo-Indistinguishability [1] and Location Set Privacy [33]. We
prove that they are two instances of PGLP under the different configuration
of the location policy graph. We also design mechanisms for PGLP by adapting
the Laplace mechanism and Planar Isotropic Mechanism (PIM) (i.e., the optimal
mechanism for Location Set Privacy [33]) w.r.t. a given location policy graph.
Second, we design algorithms that examine the feasibility of achieving a given
location policy graph under adversarial knowledge. As shown in Fig.1, some
nodes (locations) in a policy graph may be excluded (e.g., s4 and s6 in Fig.1 (b))
or disconnected (e.g., s5 in Fig.1 (b)) due to the adversary’s knowledge about
the constrained domain. Protecting the excluded nodes is a lost cause as those as
mentioned earlier, but it is necessary to protect the disconnected nodes since it
may lead to location exposure when the user is at such a location. Surprisingly,
we find that a disconnected node may not always result in the location exposure,
which also depends on the protection strength of the mechanism. Intuitively, this
happens when a mechanism “overprotects” a location policy graph by implicitly
guaranteeing indistinguishability that is not enforced by the policy. We design an
algorithm to distinguish the non-risky and risky disconnected nodes that suffer
location exposure. We call the later isolated node. We also design a graph repair
algorithm to ensure no isolated node in a location policy graph by adding an
optimal edge between the isolated node and another node with high utility.
Third, we propose an end-to-end private location trace release framework
with PGLP that takes inputs of the user’s true location at each time t and
outputs private location continuously satisfying a pre-defined location policy
graph. The framework pipelines the calculation of constrained domains, isolated
node detection, policy graph repair, and private location release mechanism. We
also reason about the overall privacy guarantee in multiple releases.
Finally, we implement and evaluate the proposed algorithms on real-world
datasets, showing that privacy and utility can be better tuned with customizable
location policy graphs.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Location Data Model
Similar to [33, 34], we employ two coordinate systems to represent locations for
applicability for different application scenarios. A location can be represented by
an index of grid coordinates or by a two-dimension vector of longitude-latitude
coordinate to indicate any location on the map. Specifically, we partition the map
into grids such that each grid corresponds to an area (or a point of interest);
any location represented by a longitude-latitude coordinate will also have a grid
number or index on the grid coordinate. We denote the location domain as
S = {s1, s2, · · · , sN} where each si corresponds to a grid on the map, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
We use s∗t and zt to denote the user’s true location and perturbed location at
time t. We abuse s∗ and z without subscript t when it is clear from the context.
Location Query For the ease of reasoning about privacy and utility, we use
a location query f : S → R2 to represent the mapping from locations to the
longitude and latitude of the center of the corresponding grid.
2.2 Problem Statement
Given a moving user on a map S in a period {1, 2, · · · , T}, our goal is to re-
lease the perturbed locations of the user to untrusted third parties such as
LBS at each timestamp under a pre-defined location privacy policy. Before
investigating the design of a customizable location privacy metrics, we define
-Indistinguishability, which is generalized from differential privacy [10], as a
building block for reasoning about our privacy goal.
Definition 1 (-Indistinguishability). Two locations si and sj are -indistin-
guishable under a randomized mechanism A iff for any output z ⊆ Range(A),
we have Pr(A(si)=z)Pr(A(sj)=z) ≤ e, where  ≥ 0.
In this paper, we use a general utility metrics for LBS, which is the Euclidean
distance between of the released location z and the user’s true location s∗, i.e.,
Error =
√
E||z− f(s∗)||22. We note that the utility metrics could be application-
defined and optimized accordingly.
Adversarial Model We assume that the attackers know the user’s mobility
pattern modeled by Markov chain, which is widely used for modeling user mo-
bility profiles [5, 14]. We use matrix M ∈ [0, 1]N×N to denote the transition
probabilities of Markov chain with mij being the probability of moving from lo-
cation si to location sj . Another adversarial knowledge is the initial probability
distribution of the user’s location at t = 1. To generalize the notation, we denote
probability distribution of the user’s location at t by a vector pt ∈ [0, 1]1×N , and
denote the ith element in pt by pt[i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si), where s
∗
t is the user’s true
location at t and si ∈ S. Given the above knowledge, the attackers could in-
fer the user’s possible locations at time t, which is probably smaller than the
location domain S, and we call it a constrained domain.
Definition 2 (Constrained domain). We denote Ct = {si|Pr(s∗t = si) >
0, si ∈ S} as constrained domain, which indicates a set of possible locations at t.
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3 Policy Graph based Location Privacy
In this section, we first formalize the privacy requirement using location policy
graph in Sec.3.1. We then design the privacy metrics of PGLP in Sec.3.2. Finally,
we propose two mechanisms for PLGP in Sec.3.3.
3.1 Location Policy Graph
Inspired by Blowfish privacy [19], we use an undirected graph to define what
should be protected and what could not, i.e., privacy policies. The nodes are
secrets, and the edges are the required indistinguishability, which indicates an
attacker should not be able to distinguish the input secrets by observing the
perturbed output. In our setting, we treat possible locations as nodes and the
indistinguishability between the locations as edges.
Definition 3 (Location Policy Graph). A location policy graph is an undi-
rected graph G = (S, E) where S denotes all the locations (nodes) and E repre-
sents indistinguishability (edges) between these locations.
Definition 4 (Distance in Policy Graph). We define the distance between
two nodes si and sj in a policy graph as the length of the shortest path between
them, denoted by dG(si, sj).
In DP, the two possible database instances with or without a user’s data are
called neighboring databases, which can be interpreted as two nodes with an edge
in a policy graph. We generalize it to k-neighbors defined below.
Definition 5 (k-Neighbors). The k-neighbors of location s, denoted by N k(s),
is the set of nodes that reach s within k hops, i.e., N k(s) = {s′|dG(s, s′) ≤ k, s′ ∈
S}. We define∞-neighbors as the nodes having a path with s, denoted by N∞(s).
In our framework, we assume the location policy graph is given and public. In
practice, the location privacy policy could be application-defined and identical
for all users using the same application; thus, making the policy graph public
will not reveal anything about an individual.
3.2 Privacy Metrics
We now formalize PGLP, which guarantees -indistinguishability in Definition 1
for every pair of neighbors (i.e., for each edge) in a given location policy graph.
Definition 6 ({,G}-Location Privacy). A randomized algorithm A satisfies
{,G}-location privacy iff for all z ⊆ Range(A) and for all pairs of 1-neighbors
s and s′ in G, we have Pr(A(s)=z)
Pr(A(s′)=z) ≤ e.
In PGLP, privacy is rigorously guaranteed through ensuring indistinguisha-
bility between any two neighboring locations specified by a customizable location
policy graph. The user enjoys plausible deniability about her whereabouts.
Lemma 1. An algorithm A satisfies {,G}-location privacy, iff any two ∞-
neighbors si, sj ∈ G are  · dG(si, sj)-indistinguishable.
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Fig. 2: Two examples of location policy graphs.
Lemma 1 indicates that, if there is a path between two nodes si, sj in the
policy graph, the corresponding indistinguishability is required at a certain de-
gree; if two nodes are not connected (i.e., si /∈ N∞(sj)), the indistinguishability
is not required by the policy. As an extreme case, if a node is not connected with
any other nodes, it allows us to release it without any perturbation.
Comparison with Other Location Privacy Models We analyze the relation
between PGLP and two influential DP-based location privacy models, i.e., Geo-
Indistinguishability [1] and δ-Location Set Privacy [33]. We show that PGLP
implies each of them under proper configurations of location policy graphs.
Geo-Indistinguishability [1] guarantees a level of indistinguishability between
two locations si and sj that is scaled with their Euclidean distance, i.e.,  ·
dE(si, sj)-indistinguishability, where dE(·, ·) denotes Euclidean distance. Let G1
be a location policy graph that every location has edges with its closest eight
locations on the map, as shown in Fig.2 (a).
We can derive Theorem 2 by Lemma 1 with the fact of dG(si, sj) ≤ dE(si, sj)
for any si, sj ∈ G1 (e.g., in Fig.2(a), dG(s1, s2) = 3 and dE(s1, s2) =
√
10).
Theorem 1. An algorithm satisfying {,G1}-location privacy also achieves -
Geo-Indistinguishability.
δ-Location Set Privacy [33] extends differential privacy on a subset of possi-
ble locations, which is assumed as adversarial knowledge. We note that the con-
strained domain in Definition 2 can be considered a generalization of δ-location
set, whereas we do not specify the calculation of this set in PGLP. δ-Location Set
Privacy ensures indistinguishability among any two locations in the δ-location
set. Let G2 be a location policy graph that is complete, i.e., fully connected
among all locations in the δ-location set as shown in Fig.2(b).
Theorem 2. An algorithm satisfying {,G2}-location privacy also achieves δ-
Location Set privacy.
We defer the proofs of the theorems to a full version because of space limitation.
3.3 Mechanisms for PGLP
In the following, we show how to transform existing DP mechanisms into one
satisfying PGLP using graph-calibrated sensitivity. We temporarily assume the
constrained domain C = S; we study the effect of C on policy G in Section 4.
As shown in Section 2.1, the problem of private location release can be seen
as answering a location query f : S → R2 privately. Then we can adapt the
existing DP mechanism for releasing private locations by adding random noises
to longitude and latitude independently. We use this approach below to adapt
the Laplace mechanism and Planar Isotropic Mechanism (PIM) (i.e., an optimal
mechanism for Location Set Privacy [33]) to achieve PGLP.
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Policy-based Laplace Mechanism (P-LM). Laplace mechanism is built on
the `1-norm sensitivity [11], defined as the maximum change of the query results
due to the difference of neighboring databases. In our setting, we calibrate this
sensitivity w.r.t. the neighbors specified in a location policy graph.
Definition 7 (Graph-calibrated `1-norm Sensitivity). For a location s and
a query f(s): s→ R2, its `1-norm sensitivity SGf is the maximum `1 norm of ∆fG
where ∆fG is a set of points (i.e., two-dimension vectors) of
(
f(s)−f(s′))/dG(s, s′)
for any s′ ∈ N∞(s) ., i.e. SGf = sup||∆fG ||1 where || · ||1 denotes the `1 norm.
We propose policy-based Laplace mechanism (P-LM) below.
Algorithm 1 Policy-based Laplace Mechanism (P-LM)
Require: , G, the user’s true location s.
1: Calculate SGf = sup||
(
f(s)− f(s′))/dG(s, s′)||1 for all s′ ∈ N∞(s);
2: Perturb location z′ = f(s) + [Lap(SGf /), Lap(S
G
f /)]
T ;
3: return a location z ∈ S that is closest to z′ on the map.
Theorem 3. P-LM satisfies {,G}-location privacy.
Policy-based Planar Isotropic Mechanism (P-PIM). PIM [33] achieves
the low bound of differential privacy on two-dimension space for Location Set
Privacy. It adds noises to longitude and latitude using K-norm mechanism [17]
with sensitivity hull [33], which extends the convex hull of the sensitivity space
in K-norm mechanism. We propose a graph-calibrated sensitivity hull for PGLP.
Definition 8 (Graph-calibrated Sensitivity Hull). For a location s and a
query f(s): s→ R2, the graph-calibrated sensitivity hull K(G) is the convex hull
of ∆fG where ∆fG is a set of points (i.e., two-dimension vectors) of
(
f(s) −
f(s′)
)
/dG(s, s′) for any s′ ∈ N∞(s) w.r.t. the policy G, i.e., K(G) = Conv(∆fG).
Definition 9 (K-norm Mechanism [17]). Given any function f(s): s→ Rd
and its sensitivity hull K, K-norm mechanism outputs z withh probability below.
Pr(z) =
1
Γ (d+ 1)Vol(K/)
exp (−||z− f(s)||K) (1)
where Γ (·) is Gamma function and Vol(·) denotes volume.
We propose policy-based Planar Isotropic Mechanism below.
Algorithm 2 Policy-based Planar Isotropic Mechanism (P-PIM)
Require: , G, the user’s true location s.
1: Calculate K(G) = Conv||(f(s)− f(s′))/dG(s, s′)||1 for all s′ ∈ N∞(s);
2: z′ = f(s) + Y where Y is two-dimension noise drawn by Eq.(1) with sensitivity hull K(G);
3: return a location z ∈ S that is closest to z′ on the map.
Theorem 4. P-PIM satisfies {,G}-location privacy.
We can prove Theorems 3 and 4 using Lemma 1. The sensitivity is scaled
with the graph-based distance. We note that directly using Laplace machanism or
PIM can satisfy a fully connected policy graph over locations in the constrained
domain as shown in Fig.2(b).
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2 has the time complexity O(|C| log(h)+h2 log(h)) where
h is number of vertices on the polygon of Conv(∆fG).
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4 Policy Graph under Constrained Domain
4.1 Location Exposure
As shown in Fig.1 (right) and introduced in Section 1, a given policy graph may
not be viable under adversarial knowledge of constrained domain (Definition 2).
We illustrate the potential risks due to the constrained domain shown in Fig.3.
o 21 3
1
2
f(s4)
f(s5)
f(s3)
f(s2)
f1(longitude)
f2(latitude)
f(s1)
f(s6)
s4
s5
s3
s2
s1
s6
(East)
(North) (a) (b)
Fig. 3: (a) The constrained domain C = {s2, s3, s5}; (b) The constrained policy graph.
First, we examine the immediate consequences of the constrained domain to
the policy graph. We define the excluded and disconnected nodes below.
Definition 10 (Excluded node). Given a location policy graph G = (S, E)
and a constrained domain C ⊂ S, if s ∈ S and s 6∈ C, s is an excluded node.
Definition 11 (Disconnected node). Given a location policy graph G = (S, E)
and a constrained domain C ⊂ S, if a node s ∈ C, N 1(s) 6= ∅ and N 1(s)∩C = ∅,
we call s a disconnected node.
Intuitively, the excluded node is outside of the constrained domain C, such
as the gray nodes {s1, s4, s6} in Fig.3; whereas the disconnected node (e.g., s5 in
Fig.3) is inside of C and has 1-neigbors, yet all its 1-neighbors are outside of C.
Next, we analyze the feasibility of a location policy graph under a constrained
domain. The first problem is that, by the definition of excluded nodes, it is not
possible to achieve indistinguishability between the excluded nodes and any other
nodes. For example in Fig.3, the indistinguishability indicated by the gray edges
is not feasible because of Pr(A(s4) = z) = Pr(A(s6) = z) = 0 for any z given
the adversarial knowledge of Pr(s4) = Pr(s6) = 0. Hence, one can only achieve a
constrained policy graph, such as the one with nodes {s2, s3, s5} in Fig.3(b).
Definition 12 (Constrained Location Policy Graph). A constrained loca-
tion policy graph GC is a subgraph of the original location policy graph G un-
der a constrained domain C that only includes the edges inside of C. Formally,
GC = (C, EC) where C ⊆ S and EC ⊆ E.
Another problem is that the disconnected node may lead to location exposure.
Definition 13 (Location Exposure under constrained domain). Given
a policy graph G, constrained domain C and an algorithm A satisfying (,GC)-
location privacy, for a disconnected node s, if A does not guarantee -indistinguish-
ability between s and any other nodes in C, we call s isolated node. The user
suffers location exposure when she is at the location of the isolated node.
We prevent the location exposure by detecting the isolated node in Sec.4.2
and repairing the constrained policy graph in Sec.4.3.
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4.2 Detecting Isolated Node
An interesting finding is that a disconnected node may not always lead to loca-
tion exposure, which also depends on the algorithm for PGLP. Intuitively, the
indistinguishability between a disconnected node and a node in the constrained
domain could be guaranteed implicitly. We give an example of disconnected but
not isolated node in appendix A.
We design Algorithm 3 to detect the isolated node in a constrained policy
graph w.r.t. P-PIM. It could be extended to any other PGLP mechanism. For
each disconnected node, we check whether it is indistinguishable with other
nodes. The problem is equivalent to checking if there is any node inside the
convex body f(si) + K(GC), which can be solved by the convexity property (If
a point sj is inside a convex hull K, then sj can be expressed by the vertices of
K with coefficients in [0, 1]) with complexity O(m3). We design a faster method
with complexity O(m2log(m)) by exploiting the definition of convex hull: if sj
is inside f(si) + K(GC), then the new convex hull of the new graph by adding
edge sisj will be the same as K(GC).
Algorithm 3 Finding Isolated Node
Require: G, C, disconnected node si ∈ C.
1: ∆fG = ∨
sjsk∈EC
(f(sj)− f(sk)); . We use ∨ to denote Union operator.
2: K(GC)← Conv(∆fG);
3: for all sj ∈ C, sj 6= si do
4: if Conv(∆fG , f(sj)− f(si)) == K(GC) then
5: return false . not isolated
6: end if
7: end for
8: return true . isolated
4.3 Repairing Location Policy Graph
To prevent location exposure under the constrained domain, we need to make
sure that there is no isolated node in a constrained policy graph. A simple way
is to modify the policy graph to ensure the indistinguishability of the isolated
node by adding an edge between it and another node in the constrained domain.
The selection of such a node could depend on the requirement of the application.
Without the loss of generality, a baseline method for repairing the policy graph
could be choosing an arbitrary node from the constrained domain and adding
an edge between it and the isolated node.
A natural question is how can we repair the policy graph with higher utility.
Since different ways of adding edges in the policy graph may lead to distinct
graph-based sensitivity, which is propositional to the area of the sensitivity hull
(i.e., a polygon on the map), the question is equivalent to adding an edge with
the minimum area of sensitivity hull (thus the least noises). We design Algorithm
4 to find the minimum area of the new sensitivity hull, as shown in an example
of Fig.4. The analysis is shown in Appendix B. We note that the algorithm is
oblivious to the true location, so it does not consume the privacy budget.
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Fig. 4: An example of graph repair with high utility. (a): if C = {s3, s4, s5, s6}, then s3
is isolated because f(s3) +K(GC) only contains s3; to protect s3, we can re-connect s3
to one of the valid nodes {s4, s5, s6}. (b) shows the new sensitivity hull after adding
f(s4)−f(s3) to K(GC); (c) shows the new sensitivity hull after adding f(s6)−f(s3) to
K(GC); (d) shows the new sensitivity hull after adding f(s5)−f(s3) to K(GC). Because
(b) has the smallest area of the sensitivity hull, s3 should be connected to s4.
Algorithm 4 Graph Repair with High Utility
Require: G, C, isolated node si
1: GC ← G ∧ C;
2: K ← K(GC);
3: sk ← ∅;
4: minArea←∞;
5: for all sj ∈ C, sj 6= si do
6: K ← K(GC ∨ sisj); . new sensitivity hull in O(mlog(m))
7: Area =
i=h∑
i=1,j=i+1
det(vi,vj) where vh+1 = v1; . Θ(h) time
8: if Area < minArea then
9: sk ← sj ;
10: minArea = Area; . find minimum area
11: end if
12: end for
13: GC ← GC ∨ sisk . add edge sisk to the graph
14: return repaired policy graph GC;
5 Location Trace Release with PGLP
5.1 Location Release via Hidden Markov Model
A remaining question for continuously releasing private location with PGLP is
how to calculate the adversarial knowledge of constrained domain Ct at each
time t. According to our adversary model described in Sec.2.2, the attacker
knows the user’s mobility pattern modeled by the Markov chain and the ini-
tial probability distribution of the user’s location. The attacker also knows the
released mechanisms for PGLP. Hence, the problem of calculating the possible
location domain (i.e., locations that Pr(s∗t ) > 0) can be modeled as an inference
problem in Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in Figure 5: the attacker attempts to
infer the probability distribution of the true location s∗t , given the PGLP mech-
anism, the Markov model of s∗t , and the observation of z1, · · · , zt at the current
time t. The constrained domain at each time is derived as the locations in the
probability distribution of s∗t with non-zero probability.
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Fig. 5: Private location trace release via HMM.
We elaborate the calculation of the probability distribution of s∗t as follows.
The probability Pr(zt|s∗t ) denotes the distribution of the released location zt
where s∗t is the true location at any timestamp t. At timestamp t, we use p
−
t
and p+t to denote the prior and posterior probabilities of an adversary about
current state before and after observing zt respectively. The prior probability
can be derived by the (posterior) probability at previous timestamp t − 1 and
the Markov transition matrix as p−t = p
+
t−1M. The posterior probability can be
computed using Bayesian inference as follows. For each state si:
p+t [i] = Pr(s
∗
t = si|zt) = Pr(zt|s
∗
t = si)p
−
t [i]∑
j Pr(zt|s∗t = sj)p−t [j]
(2)
The location trace release mechanism is shown in Algorithm 5. At each times-
tamp t, we compute the constrained domain, as shown in Line 2. For all discon-
nected nodes under the constrained domain, we check if they are isolated by
Algorithm 3. If so, we derive a minimum protectable graph Gt by Algorithm 4.
Next, we use the proposed PGLP mechanisms (i.e., P-LM or P-PIM) to release a
perturbed location zt. Then the released zt will also be used to update the poste-
rior probability p+t (in the equation below) by Equation (2), which subsequently
will be used to compute the prior probability for the next time t+ 1.
Algorithm 5 Location Trace Release Mechanism for PGLP
Require: , G, M, p+t−1, s∗t
1: p−t ← p+t−1M; . Markov transition
2: Ct ← {si|p−t [i] > 0}; . constraint
3: GCt ← G ∧ Ct; . Definition 12
4: for all disconnected node si in GCt do
5: if si is isolated then . isolated node detection by Algorithm 3
6: GCt ← Algorithm 4(GCt , Ct, si); . repair graph Gt by Algorithm 4
7: end if
8: end for
9: mechanisms for PGLP with parameters , s∗t , Gt; . Algorithms 1 or 2
10: Derive p+t by Equation (2); . inference go to next timestamp
11: return Algorithm 5(, GCt , M, p+t , s∗t+1);
Theorem 6 (Complexity). Algorithm 5 has complexity O(dm2log(m)) where
d is the number of disconnected nodes and m is the number of nodes in GCt .
5.2 Privacy Composition
We analyze the composition theorem for multiple location releases under PGLP.
In Definition 6, we define {,G}-location privacy for single location release, where
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 can be considered the privacy leakage w.r.t. the privacy policy G. A natural
question is what would be the privacy leakage of multiple releases at a single
timestamp (i.e., for the same true location) or at multiple timestamps (i.e., for a
trajectory). In either case, the privacy guarantee (or the upper bound of privacy
leakage) in multiple releases depends on the achievable location policy graphs.
Hence, the key is to study the composition of the policy graphs in multiple
releases. Let A1, · · · ,AT be T independent random algorithms that takes true
locations s∗1, · · · , s∗T as inputs (note that it is possible s∗1 = · · · = s∗T ) and outputs
z1, · · · , zT , respectively. When the viable policy graphs are the same at each
release, we have Lemma 2 as below.
Lemma 2. If all A1, · · · ,AT satisfy (,G)-location privacy, the combination of
{A1, · · · ,AT } satisfies (T,G)-location privacy.
As shown in Sec.4, the feasibility of achieving a policy graph is affected by
the constrained domain, which may change along with the released locations. We
denote G1, · · · ,GT as viable policy graphs at each release (for single location or
for a trajectory), which could be obtained by algorithms in Sec.4.2 and Sec.4.3.
We give a more general composition theorem for PGLP below.
Theorem 7. If A1, · · · ,AT satisfy (1,G1), · · · , (T ,GT ), -location privacy, respec-
tively, the combination of {A1, · · · ,AT } satisfies
(∑T
i=1 i,G1 ∧ · · · ∧ GT
)
-location
privacy, where ∧ denotes the intersection between the edges of policy graphs.
6 Experiments
6.1 Experimental Setting
We implement the algorithms use Python 3.7. The code is available in github7.
We run the algorithms on a machine with Intel core i7 6770k CPU and 64 GB
of memory running Ubuntu 15.10 OS.
Datasets. We evaluate the algorithms on three real-world datasets with similar
configurations in [33] for comparison purpose. The Markov models were learned
from the raw data. For each dataset, we randomly choose 20 users’ location trace
with 100 timestamps for testing.
– Geolife dataset [35] contains tuples with attributes of user ID, latitude, lon-
gitude and timestamp. We extracted all the trajectories within the Fourth
Ring of Beijing to learn the Markov model, with the map partitioned into
cells of 0.34× 0.34 km2.
– Gowalla dataset [8] contains 6, 442, 890 check-in locations of 196, 586 users
over 20 months. We extracted all the check-ins in Los Angeles to train the
Markov model, with the map partitioned into cells of 0.37× 0.37 km2.
– Peopleflow dataset8 includes 102, 468 locations of 11, 406 users with semantic
labels of POI in Tokyo. We partitioned the map into cells of 0.27× 0.27 km2.
7 https://github.com/tkgsn/pglp.
8 http://pflow.csis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
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Fig. 6: Utility of P-LM vs. P-PIM with respect to Gk9, Gk16 and Gpoi.
Policy Graphs. We evaluate two types of location privacy policy graphs for
different applications as introduced in Section 1. One is for the policy of “allowing
to disclose a user’s location in which area but ensuring indistinguishability among
locations in each area”, represented by Gk9, Gk16, Gk25 below. The other is for
the policy of “allowing to disclose the semantic label (e.g., a restaurant or a
shop) of a user’s location but ensuring indistinguishability among locations with
the same category”, represented by Gpoi below.
– Gk9 is policy graph that all locations in each 3×3 region (i.e., having 9 loca-
tions per grid using grid coordinates defined in Sec.2.1) are fully connected
with each other. Similarly, we have Gk16 and Gk25 for region size 4× 4 and
5× 5, respectively.
– Gpoi: all locations with both the same category and the same 6×6 region are
fully connected. We test the category of restaurant in Peopleflow dataset.
Utility Metrics. We evaluate three types of utility (error) for different appli-
cations. We run the mechanisms 200 times and averaging the results. Note that
the lower value of the following metrics, the better utility.
– The general utility was measured by Euclidean distance, i.e., Eeu, between
the released location and the true location as defined in Sec.2.2.
– The utility for weather apps or road traffic monitoring, i.e., “whether the
released location is in the same region with the true location”. We measure
it by Er = ||R(s∗), R(z)||0 where R(·) return the index of the region. Here we
define the region size as 5× 5 grids.
– The utility for POI mining and semantic location mining, i.e., “whether the
released location is the same category with the true location”. We measure it
by Epoi = ||C(s∗), C(z)||0 where C(·) return the category of the corresponding
location. Here we specifically evaluate the location category of “restaurant”.
6.2 Results and Analysis
P-LM vs. P-PIM. Fig.6 compares the utility of two proposed mechanisms P-
LM and P-PIM for PGLP under the policy graphs Gk9, Gk16 , Gk25 and Gpoi on
Peopleflow dataset. The utility of P-PIM outperforms P-LM for different policy
graphs and different  since the sensitivity hull could achieve lower error bound.
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Fig. 8: Evaluation of Graph Repair.
Utility Grain by Tuning Policy Graphs. We evaluate the utility of differ-
ent types of applications when using different policy graphs on the Peopleflow
dataset. Fig.7 shows that, for utility metrics Eeu, Er and Epoi, the policy graphs
with the best utility are Gk9, Gk25 and Gpoi, respectively. Gk9 has smallest Eeu
because of the least sensitivity. When the query is 5× 5 region query, Gk25 has
the full usability (Er=0). When the query is POI query like the one mentioned
above, Gpoi leads to full utility (Er=0) since Gpoi allows to disclose the semantic
category of the true location while maintaining the indistinguishability among
the set of locations with the same category. We conclude that location policy
graphs can be tailored flexibly for better utility-privacy trade-off.
Evaluation of Graph Repair. Fig. 8 shows the results of graph repair al-
gorithms. We compare the proposed Algorithm 4 with a baseline method that
repairs the problematic policy graph by adding an edge between the isolated
node with its nearest node in the constrained domain. It shows that the utility
measured by Eeu of Algorithm 4 is always better than the baseline but at the
cost of higher runtime. Notably, the utility is decreasing (i.e., higher Eeu ) with
larger constrained domains because of larger policy graph (thus higher sensi-
tivity); a larger constrained domain also incurs higher runtime because more
isolated nodes need to be processed.
Evaluation of Location Trace Release. We demonstrate the utility of private
trajectory release with PGLP in Fig. 9 and Fig.10.
In Fig. 9, we show the results of P-LM and P-PIM on the Geolife Dataset.
We test 20 users’ trajectories with 100 timestamps and average Eeu at each
timestamp. We can see P-PIM has higher utility than P-PIM, which in line with
the results for single location release. The error Eeu is increasing along with
timestamps due to the constrained domain becomes larger, which is in line with
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Fig. 10: Utility of Private Trajectory Release with different Policy Graphs.
Fig.8. The average of Eeu across 100 timestamps on different policy graphs, i.e.,
Gk9, Gk16 and Gk25 is also in accordance with the single location release in Fig.7.
Gk9 has the least average error of Eeu due to the smallest sensitivity.
In Fig.10, we show the utility of P-PIM with different policy graphs on two
different datasets Geolife and Gowalla. The utility of Gk9 is always the best
over different timestamps and two datasets. In general, the Gowalla dataset
has better utility than the Geolife dataset because the constraint domain of
the Gowalla dataset is smaller. The reason is that the Gowalla dataset collects
check-in locations that have an apparent mobility pattern, as shown in [8]. While
Geolife dataset collects GPS trajectory with diverse transportation modes such
as walk, bus, or train; thus, the trained Markov model is less accurate.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a flexible and rigorous location privacy framework
named PGLP, to release private location continuously under the real-world con-
straints with customized location policy graphs. We show that the policy graph
is vulnerable under constrained domains, which may lead to location exposure.
We provide a novel way to address this issue by efficient policy graph detection
and graph repair algorithms. We design an end-to-end private location trace
release algorithm satisfying a pre-defined location privacy policy. The experi-
ments demonstrate that the location policy graph can be tailored flexibly for
utility-privacy trade-off under different utility metrics.
For future work, there are several promising directions. One direction is to
study how to use the rich interface of PGLP for the utility-privacy tradeoff in
the real-world location-based applications, such as carefully designing location
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privacy policies for COVID-19 contact tracing. Another exciting direction is to
design optimal mechanisms to achieve a given location privacy policy.
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Appendix A An example of Isolated Node
Intuition. We examine the privacy guarantee of P-PIM w.r.t. GC in Fig.3(a).
According to K-norm Mechanism [17] in Definition 9, P-PIM guarantees that,
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for any two 1-neighbors si and sj , their difference is bounded in the convex body
K, i.e. f(si) − f(sj) ∈ K. Geometrically, for a location s, all other locations in
the convex body of K + f(s) are -indistinguishable with s.
Example 1 (Disconnected but Not Isolated Node). In Figure 11, s2 is discon-
nected under constraint C = {s2, s4, s5, s6}. However, s2 is not isolated because
f(s2) +K contains f(s4) and f(s5). Hence, s2 and other nodes in C are indistin-
guishable.
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Fig. 11: (a) A policy graph under C = {s2, s4, s5, s6}; (b) the ∆fG of vectors f(si) −
f(sj); (c) the sensitivity hull K(GC) covering the ∆fG ; (d) the shape f(s2) + K(GC)
containing f(s4) and f(s5). That is to say, s2 is indistinguishable with s4 and s5.
Appendix B Policy Graph Repair Algorithm
Figure 4(a) shows the graph under constraint C = {s3, s4, s5, s6}. Then s3 is
exposed because f(s3)+KG contains no other node. To satisfy the PGLP without
isolated nodes, we need to connect s3 to another node in C, i.e. s4, s5 or s6.
If s3 is connected to s4, then Figure 4(b) shows the new graph and its sensi-
tivity hull. By adding two new edges {f(s3)−f(s4), f(s4)−f(s3)} to ∆fG , the shaded
areas are attached to the sensitivity hull. Similarly, Figures 4(c) and (d) show
the new sensitivity hulls when s3 is connected to s6 and s5 respectively. Because
the smallest area of KG is in Figure 4(b), the repaired graph is GC ∨ s3s4, i.e.,
add adge s3s4 to the graph GC .
Theorem 8. Algorithm 4 takes O(m2log(m)) time where m is the number of
valid nodes (with edge) in the policy graph.
Algorithm. Algorithm 4 derives the minimum protectable graph for location
data when an isolated node is detected. We can connect the isolated node si to
the rest (at most m) nodes, generating at most m convex hulls where m = |V| is
the number of valid nodes. In two-dimensional space, it only takes O(mlog(m))
time to find a convex hull. To derive Area of a shape, we exploit the computation
of determinant whose intrinsic meaning is the Volume of the column vectors.
Therefore, we use
i=h∑
i=1,j=i+1
det(vi,vj) to derive the Area of a convex hull with
clockwise nodes v1,v2, · · · ,vh where h is the number of vertices and vh+1 = v1.
By comparing the area of these convex hulls, we can find the smallest area in
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O(m2log(m)) time where m is the number of valid nodes. Note that Algorithms
3 and 4 can also be combined together to protect any disconnected nodes.
Appendix C Related Works
C.1 Differential Privacy
While differential privacy [10] has been accepted as a standard notion for privacy
protection, most works used Laplace mechanism [11] to release differentially
private data. Based on Laplace mechanism, Li et al. proposed Matrix mechanism
[22] to answer a batch of queries by factorizing a query matrix to generate
a better “strategy” matrix that can replace the original query matrix. Other
mechanisms, such as Exponential mechanism [26] and K-Norm mechanism [17],
were also proposed to guarantee differential privacy. We refer readers to [18] for
a comparative study of the mechanisms.
Because the concept of standard differential privacy is not generally appli-
cable, several variants or generalizations of differential privacy, such as induced
neighbors privacy [21], have been proposed. Among these variants, Blowfish pri-
vacy [19] is the first generic framework with customizable privacy policy. It
defines sensitive information as secrets and known knowledge about the data
as constraints. By constructing a policy graph, which should also be consistent
with all constraints, Blowfish privacy can be formally defined. We extend Blow-
fish framework to Markov model, and quantify the overall protection of Blowfish
privacy in both database context and Markov model.
The lower bound of differentially private query-answering was also inves-
tigated. Hardt and Talwar [17] proposed the theoretical lower bound for any
differentially private mechanisms. To achieve the lower bound, they also studied
K-Norm based algorithms to release differentially private data. In the query an-
swering setting,K-Norm mechanism is optimal only when the sensitivity hull [33]
is in isotropic position. In this paper, we extend the K-Norm mechanism by in-
vestigating the sensitivity hull K in the new setting of location privacy.
C.2 Location Privacy
A close line of works focus on extending differential privacy to location setting.
The first DP-based location privacy model is Geo-Indistinguishability [1], which
scales the sensitivity of two locations to their Euclidean distance. Hence, it is
suitable for proximity-based applications. Following by Geo-Indistinguishability,
several works [32] [34] have been proposed based on differential privacy. A recent
work proposed spatiotemporal event privacy [4], which proposed a new repre-
sentation for secrets in spatiotemporal data called spatiotemoral events using
Boolean expression. It is essentially different from our work since we are con-
sidering the traditional representation of secrets, i.e., each single location or a
sequence of locations.
Several works considered Markov models for improving utility of released lo-
cation traces or web browsing activities [6,12], but did not consider the inference
risks when an adversary has the knowledge of the Markov model. Xiao et al. [33]
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studied how to protect the true location if a user’s movement follows Markov
model. The technique can be viewed as a special instantiation of PGLP.
